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The Current Status of Mercenaries
in the Law of Armed Conflict
By EDWARD KWAKWA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although mercenaries have been involved in the conduct of war for
centuries, events in recent years have raised new questions about merce-
naries and their status in the law of war.' The 1976 trial of thirteen
mercenaries in Angola highlighted the phenomenon of mercenarism 2 as a
central world concern. As recently as December 1989, the mercenary
problem was brought to the fore again as a result of mercenary activity in
the Comoro Islands. Finally, in December 1989, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the International Convention Against the Re-
cruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries.'
One of the most important events in the recent development of in-
ternational law regarding mercenaries occurred in 1977. In that year, the
community of states promulgated two protocols to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions4 relating to the protection of victims of international armed
* Associate, O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C.; LL.B (Hons.), Univ. of Ghana,
1984; LL.M, Queen's Univ., Canada, 1986; LL.M, Yale Univ., 1987; J.S.D., Yale Univ., 1990.
This is a revised version of part of a thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the
J.S.D. degree at the Yale Law School. The author is fully responsible for the views expressed,
but is grateful for the critiques of his Supervisor, Prof. Michael Reisman, and Advisors, Profs.
Paul Kahn and Harold Koh.
1. In this Article, the terms "law of war," "law of armed conflict," and "humanitarian
law" are used interchangeably.
2. The word "mercenarism" does not appear in dictionaries. However, the term first
was used by the International Commission of Inquiry on Mercenaries in Luanda, Angola, in
June 1976 to refer to mercenariness. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
3. See International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training
of Mercenaries, Dec. 11, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/34,44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 306, U.N.
Doe. A/44/49 (1989), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 89 (1990) [hereinafter International Convention
on Mercenaries]. As of July 1990 the Convention had not yet come into force.
4. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.LA.S. No. 3362,75 U.N.T.S. 31; Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.LA.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.ILA.S.
No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Convention Relative to the
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conflicts.' The debate over the import and scope of these protocols is still
lively and unsettled. One of the most controversial provisions in Proto-
col I is article 47 regarding mercenaries.6 The United States has refused
to ratify Protocol I because of its objections to the provisions on merce-
naries and other irregular combatants.7
The legal status of mercenaries raises two cognate issues. First, it
raises the issue of whether a mercenary's conduct in an armed conflict
can lead to an inference of an armed conflict between the mercenary's
state of nationality and the state or entity against which the mercenary is
fighting. The second issue, which is the focus of this Article, concerns
the treatment of mercenaries who take part in armed conflict. Although
more concerned with thejus in bello,8 the discussion also will show that
thejus in bello issues relating to mercenaries are sometimes interwoven
with considerations of the jus ad bellum.
This Article discusses the problem of defining the term mercenary,
and places the problem of mercenaries in historicad context. The Article
also describes some of the efforts made at the domestic and international
levels to tackle the mercenary problem, and analyzes current trends in
the treatment of mercenaries under the jus in bello. This Article con-
cludes that article 47 of Protocol I, the most recent effort at codifying a
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No,
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
5. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doe. A/32/144, Annexes I, 11 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391
(1977)[hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col II), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes 1, 11 (1977), re-
printed in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
6. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 47, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1412 (1977).
7. In a letter of transmittal to the U.S. Senate, former President Reagan urged the advice
and consent of the Senate to ratify Protocol II. The Reagan administration concluded that tile
United States could not ratify Protocol I for several reasons, one of which was the provision on
mercenaries. See Letter of Transmittal from President Reagan to the U.S. Senate (Jan. 29,
1987), PROTOCOL II ADDITIONAL TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS, AND RELATING TO
THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. III (1987), reprinted in Ago,"a: The U.S. Decision Not to
Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions in the Protection of Mar Victims, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 912 (1987) [hereinafter Letter of Transmittal]. For the position of the Reagan Administra-
tion, see Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 901, 912-15 (1986). On the United
States decision not to ratify Protocol I, see Gasser, An Appealfor Ratification by the United
States, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 912 (1987).
8. Jus in bello denotes the rules applicable in an armed conflict.
9. Jus ad bellum refers to the authority to resort to force.
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definition of mercenary, is inadequate in several respects, particularly in
its denial of combatant and prisoner of war status to mercenaries.
Two premises form the basis of this Article. The first premise is that
the underlying rationale for the international humanitarian law of war is
the protection of individuals and victims of war. Humanitarianism in
armed conflict should be seen as an integral and very important part of
general international law. The humanitarian laws of war should be re-
garded as a subset of the laws of humanity, or of human rights in general.
Thus, whenever the principles of military necessity and the sovereignty
of states conflict with humanitarian interests, the conflict must be re-
solved in favor of the latter.
The second premise is that there is a need to expand protection
under the laws of war to as many combatants and conflicts as possible. A
basic function of the law of war is to reconcile military ends with civilian
interests to enhance the safety and well-being of combatants as well as
noncombatants.10 An expansive application of the laws of war will
achieve this objective. A common trend in armed conflict today is the
conduct of irregular warfare, mostly by non-state entities such as na-
tional liberation movements, mercenaries, and other irregular combat-
ants. There is a need to offer incentives to such irregular movements to
encourage their compliance with the laws of war. However, one of the
key goals of international humanitarian law is safeguarding the civilian
population from the effects of hostilities. 1 Thus, there is a pressing need
to draw a judicious balance between the safety of civilians and the desire
to offer incentives to irregular combatants. Whenever necessary, this bal-
ancing of policies should be reconciled in favor of the civilian population,
whose safety is the raison d'etre of a large part of international humanita-
rian law.
II. PROBLEMS OF DEFINTION
The definition of mercenary under international law is important
because of the legal consequences flowing from the characterization of a
combatant as a mercenary.1 2 The scope of the definition is critical in
10. Jean Pictet explains that two fundamental aspects of the law of war are the protection
of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities and the limitations on the use of
certain weapons (to mitigate the horrors of war). J. PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 49 (1985).
11. Id at 72.
12. See Burmester, The Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries in Armed Conflicts, 72 AM. J.
INT'L L. 37 (1978) ("A precise definition is of vital importance if such persons are to be de-
prived of certain legal rights and protections and if states are to be made subject to obligations
with respect to them.")
1990
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determining whether a particular combatant qualifies for protection
under the Third Geneva Convention. Under the Protocol I definition,
whether or not a combatant is found to be a mercenary can have life or
death consequences. The definition determines whether an enlistee shall
be accorded the right to combatant or prisoner of war status, a status
which ensures the holder several fundamental rights in wartime.
Mercenaries have publicly been referred to as "dogs of war," "hired
killers," and "soldiers of fortune." One of the most frequently cited defi-
nitions refers to a mercenary as a volunteer who, for monetary reward,
agrees to fight for the armed forces of a foreign state or entity.13 This
definition is problematic, as discussed below. Protocol I of 1977 defined
the term in greater detail. According to article 47(2) of Protocol I, a
mercenary is any person who:
a. is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed
conflict;
b. does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
c. is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire
for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to
the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that
promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the
armed forces of that Party;
d. is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
e. is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
f. has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on
official duty as a member of its armed forces. 14
Protocol I's definition of mercenary creates as many problems as it
solves."5 Under the definition, the mercenary must have been recruited
to take part in the fighting itself.16 The recruitment must also have been
for a particular armed conflict, and not simply on a retainer basis to be
available for any conflicts that may arise subsequent to the recruitment. 17
The requirement that the enlistee fight in an armed conflict excludes
13. Id.
14. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 47, para. 2, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1412 (1977).
15. Art. 47(2) of Protocol I is reproduced verbatim in art. 1 (1) of the International Con-
vention on Mercenaries, supra note 3. However, since the latter Convention is more concerned
with thejus ad bellum, discussion in this Article will be limited to art. 47 of Protocol I, which
deals with thejus in bello governing mercenaries.
16. Protocol I, art. 47, para. 2, supra note 5, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1412 (1977).
According to George Aldrich, this means that "even a mercenary is not a mercenary until he
goes into combat." Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 764, 776
(1981).
17. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 47, para. 2, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1412 (1977).
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technical experts such as instructors and advisers from the definition. 8
In terms of the consequences of their actions, however, there is not much
difference between the expert who advises the combatant on how to do
the killing, and the combatant who does the actual killing.19 As stated
by Mr. Allan Rosas, "[t]he distinction between an adviser and a merce-
nary may be a matter of taste."2'
Under the Protocol I definition, to qualify as a mercenary, one must
be motivated "essentially by the desire for private gain,"21 and must have
been promised "material compensation substantially in excess of that
promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the
armed forces of that Party."' The emphasis on motive introduces a psy-
chological element (analogous to the opinio jurls requirement of a cus-
tom) which may be difficult to establish. The Report of the Drafting
Committee claims the definition "provides an objective test to help deter-
mine motivations of persons serving with the armed forces of a Party to
the conflict.. . ."I However, the Report does not explain the objective
nature of the test.
The introduction of a psychological element implies that a case-by-
case examination must be done to determine the motive which led any
suspected mercenary to enlist. Although the definition requires that the
enlistee be motivated "essentially" by private gain, it is well-known that
monetary reward is not always the primary motivation which induces
foreigners to enlist in an armed conflict. For example, participants in
national liberation movements "are almost always motivated in part by
political convictions."'24 Other combatants fight because of religious con-
18. See Report of Committee III, in XV OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIc CON-
FERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANTA-
RIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS [hereinafter XV OFF. RECS.], CDDH/407/
Rev.1, para. 25 (1978) (Article 47(2) of Protocol I "excludes mere advisers by requiring that to
be a mercenary, one must in fact take a direct part in hostilities, that is, become a combatant,
albeit an illegitimate one"). See also M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH, & W. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR
=rc VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 271 (1982) ("Condition (b) which involves direct partici-
pation in hostilities precludes the classification of advisers and instructors as mercenaries even
if they are not on official duty under assignment by a state which is not a Party to the
conflict.")
19. Recognizing that there is no distinction between combatants and advisers, the
Polisario Front, which is waging an armed conflict in the Western Sahara, announced its inten-
tion to treat French technicians and instructors captured in Mauritania as mercenaries. See
Green, The Status of Mercenaries in International Law, 9 MAN. LJ. 201, 243 (1979).
20. A. RosAs, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR 395 (1976).
21. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 47, para. 2(c), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1412 (1977).
22. Id
23. XV OFF. RECS., supra note 18, para. 26.
24. Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War. The Case Against Ratification ofAdditional
1990]
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victions. Such participants, regardless of their financial gain, are not
mercenaries under the Protocol I definition.25
The Diplock Report from the United Kingdom26 recognized the
inefficacy of a definition which incorporated the motives of a mercenary:
[A]ny definition of mercenaries which required positive proof of moti-
vation would.., either be unworkable, or so haphazard in its applica-
tion as between comparable individuals as to be unacceptable.
Mercenaries, we think, can only be defined by reference to what they
do, and not by reference to why they do it.
27
The definition proposed in Protocol I excludes from the class of
mercenaries nationals of a party to the conflict and residents of territory
controlled by a party to the conflict. 28  Historically, mercenaries have
almost invariably been of a different nationality than their hosts. How-
ever, there is an inherent danger in formally excluding nationals and resi-
dents of a party from the definition of mercenaries. It may encourage
nationals or residents of a state which is a party to a conflict to enroll as
mercenaries with the forces fighting against the state of which they are
nationals or residents. Admittedly, this may be a very rare and isolated
practice. However, the travaux prdparatoires do not suggest that the
drafters anticipated a situation where a soldier with all the other attrib-
utes of a mercenary would enroll to fight against his own state in an
international conflict and thus avoid characterization as a mercenary.29
Article 47(2) is open to an even more fundamental objection. It pro-
vides, in paragraph (e), that a member of the armed forces of a party to
Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 138 (1985). There are reported cases of mercenaries who
fight solely for political reasons. See Comment, The Rights of Mercenaries as Prisoners of War,
77 MIL. L. REv. 143, 147 n.21 (1977) [hereinafter Comment] ("Mercenary Lobo Del Sol re-
ports that he fights for the excitement and for political reasons against Communists");
Borchard, The Power to Punish Neutral Volunteers in Enemy Armies, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 535
(1938) (during the Spanish Civil War, many American youths fought as mercenaries for the
Loyalists).
25. Green accurately identifies a problem involved with the motive test when he states
that a soldier who is paid the same amount as a mercenary, but who claims to have been
motivated by ideological, rather than financial reasons, would not be considered a mercenary,
See Green, supra note 19, at 244.
26. REPORT OF THE COMMITEE OF PRIVY COUNSELLORs APPOINTED TO INQUIRE
INTO THE RECRUITMENT OF MERCENARIES, 1976, CMND. No. 6569 [hereinafter REPORT].
The Diplock Committee of Privy Counsellors was set up in 1976 in the United Kingdom to
inquire into the recruitment of thirteen British subjects as mercenaries in the Angolan civil
war. See generally Lynch, British Subjects' Involvement in Foreign Military Clashes, 1978
CRIM. L. REv. 257.
27. REPORT, supra note 26, para. 7.
28. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 47, para. 2(d), reprinted in 16 IL.M. 1391, 1412 (1977),
29. See XV OFF. RECS., supra note 18.
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the conflict cannot be considered a mercenary. 30 Therefore, a hired sol-
dier can avoid being labeled a mercenary by enlisting in the armed forces
of the party on whose behalf he is fighting. A state or entity engaging the
services of mercenaries will seek to avoid the characterization of the en-
listees as mercenaries by declaring that they are members of its armed
forces. Britain employed this tactic during the UN Security Council de-
bates on the attempted invasion of the Seychelles by alleged merce-
naries.31 In response to an Argentinian protest addressed to the
government of Nepal that a battalion of the Gurkha regiment was being
sent to the islands, the United Kingdom representative stated:
[My delegation totally rejects the analogy which [Argentina] drew be-
tween the mercenaries referred to... and those regiments of Gurkhas
who have a long and distinguished record of service with the British
Crown in accordance with agreements openly and honorably arrived at
with the Government of Nepal .... The only internationally agreed
definition of who is a mercenary is to be found in Additional Protocol
1 of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. That definition excludes
anyone who is "a member of the armed forces of a party to a conflict."
The Gurkhas comprise units of regular troops; they form a fully inte-
grated part of the United Kingdom forces; they perform the same du-
ties at home and abroad as other forces. In no way can they be
classified as mercenaries.
32
The United Kingdom Permanent Representative put the case more
forcefully: "From the terms [of article 47 of Protocol I of the 1977 Pro-
tocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949], it is clear that no
person who took part in the recent conflict on the side of the United
Kingdom could properly be described as a 'mercenary.' ,,3
The British position amounts to a very strict and literal, albeit accu-
rate, interpretation of article 47 of the Protocol. Strictly interpreted, the
article's definition excludes from its purview virtually everyone who
should be considered a mercenary. Geoffrey Best concludes that "[tihe
definition is drawn so tight that hardly anyone, actually, will be so defin-
able," and "[c]ountries which have to get outside help are thus left gener-
30. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 47, para. 2(e), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1412 (1977).
31. See 37 U.N. SCOR (2359th mtg.) paras. 218-219, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2359 (1982), re-
printed in Marston, United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1982, 1982 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 337, 418.
32. Id.
33. Letter dated 30 June 1982 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the General Assembly, para. 4, U.N. General
Assembly, 12th Special Sess., U.N. Doec. A/S-12/31 (1982), reprinted in part in Marston, supra
note 31, at 418 [hereinafter Letter dated 30 June].
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ally free to do so."34 As he humorously puts it: "[A]ny mercenary who
cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves to be shot-and his
lawyer with him!"35
The definition's limited scope may be attributed to the consequences
flowing from a finding of mercenarism. As discussed later in this Article,
Protocol I declared a mercenary to be an illegal combatant not entitled to
prisoner of war status. Because of the legal consequences flowing from
this declaration, it was important to prevent abuse of the provision.
However, the denial of combatant and prisoner of war status for merce-
naries is not consistent with the general thrust of emerging trends in in-
ternational humanitarian law.
Despite the numerous flaws discussed above, article 47(2) is gener-
ally perceived as representing the most successful attempt, to date, in
creating a legal definition of the term mercenary.3 6 The definition pro-
vided in article 47(2) has been authoritatively cited even by nations
which have not joined the Protocol. For example, the United Kingdom
has referred to it as "[tlhe only internationally agreed definition of who is
a mercenary ... .,7 Under the circumstances, it may be reasonably in-
ferred that, despite its inadequacies, article 47(2) of Protocol I provides
the most comprehensive and widely accepted definition of the term mer-
cenary to date.
34. G. BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE: THE MODERN HISTORY OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 328 n.83 (1980).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Nwogugu, Recent Developments in the Law Relating to Mercenaries, 20 Rn-
VUE DE Daorr PENAL MILITAIRE ET DE DRorr DE LA GUERRE [R.D.P.M.D.G.] 11, 15
(1981) ("In spite of these unsatisfactory elements, it can confidently be asserted that article 47
is a bold and progressive step in dealing with a clearly difficult problem"); Erickson, Protocol I
A Merging of the Hague and Geneva Law ofArmed Conflict, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 557, 591 (1979)
("Article 47 offers a standard for distinguishing mercenaries from lawful combatants... [and]
complements the domestic laws of many States forbidding the recruitment of persons for par-
ticipation in foreign armed conflicts"); cf. Roberts, supra note 24, at 139 ("[G]ivcn the lack of
any humanitarian rationale, the potential for abuse in denying combatant status to 'merce-
naries,' the inherent difficulties in proving motive, and the long-standing U.S. practice viewing
mercenaries as legal combatants, the acceptance of article 47 as a law of war would serve few if
any of the goals established by either the United States or the Diplomatic Conference.")
37. 37 U.N. SCOR, supra note 31, para. 219. See also Letter dated 30 June, supra note 33,
reprinted in part in Marston, supra note 31, at 418 ("There now exists an internationally
agreed definition of [mercenaries]; it is not necessary therefore to rely upon encyclopedias, The
agreed definition is contained in article 47 of Protocol I of the 1977 Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949.")
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M. THE PROBLEM OF MERCENARIES IN
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Mercenaries have existed since the earliest recorded armed conflict.
There are published reports of the use of Numidian mercenaries by the
ancient Carthaginians.38 The Roman Empire is also reported to have
used mercenaries on a large scale, often by using one Germanic tribe to
ward off other Germanic tribes from the borders of the empire.39 In the
early fourteenth century, the Byzantium Empire employed the services of
Spanish frontiersmen, and in the fifteenth century, Swiss, Italian, and
German mercenaries were retained by princes and dukes to fight their
wars." In the early eighteenth century, the Ruma army of Morocco was
comprised primarily of Arab, Berber, Fulbe, and Tuareg mercenaries. 41
During the United States Revolutionary War, and in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries the English hired Hessians. Ohafia and
Abiriba mercenaries participated in wars waged in Eastern Nigeria in the
late nineteenth and early part of this century.42
In the twentieth century, the most extensive use of mercenaries has
been on the African continent. The development of large-scale
mercenarism in Africa coincided with the process of decolonization on
the continent.43 In the latter half of this century, mercenaries have
largely been used by ex-colonial powers, often against national liberation
movements and sometimes against other developing countries.' Other
newly independent countries have also hired mercenaries to maintain in-
ternal order and prevent secessionist wars by dissident groups. Merce-
naries were employed by the Katanga secessionists in the Congo from
1960 to 1963, and by the Tshombe and Mobutu governments in 1964.45
After the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, the Smith re-
38. 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 655 (1969).
39. 18 ENCYCLOPEDA BRrrANNICA 507 (1965). See also U.S. v. Charles Burney, 6
C.M.A. 776, 785, 21 C.M.R. 98, 107 (1956) ("During the reign of Maximilian I, of the Holy
Roman Empire, 1493-1519, the province of Swabia formed mercenary armies which were
rented out to, and fought for, the Holy Roman Empire.")
40. Nwogugu, supra note 36, at 11.
41. 1 J. AJAYT & MK CROWDER, HISTORY OF WEST AFRICA 451 (1971).
42. E. ISICHE, A HIsrORY OF THE 1BO PEOPLE 81 (1976).
43. Ik at 1-2. For example, in May 1978 communist-backed Katangan exiles, described
by Zaire as mercenaries, attacked the Zairean province of Shaba. The United States supported
Zaire in defending the attack. See Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 879, 917-20 (1978).
44. Cassese, Mercenaries: Lawful Combatants or War Criminals?, 40 Zeitschrift Fur Aus-
lindisches Offentliches Recht 1, 1 n.1 (1980).
45. For an extensive account of the use of mercenaries in the Congo, see generally S.
CLARKE, THE CONGO MERCENARY (1968).
1990]
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gime "widely resorted to the use of mercenaries in its war against the
National movements of Zimbabwe."'46 The most celebrated and reported
case of the use of mercenaries occurred during the Angolan Civil War at
the end of 1975, in which over 1000 mercenaries, mostly from the United
Kingdom, the United States, and South Africa, were recruited to fight
against the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).
47
As recently as November 1989, about thirty French and Belgian merce-
naries, under the command of "le colonel," Bob Denard, reportedly
killed the President of the Comoros.48 As discussed below, the reaction
of the international community to the recruitment and use of merce-
naries has been mixed.
IV. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
PRESCRIPTIONS
Several attempts have been made at the domestic, regional, and in-
ternational levels to deal with the problem of mercenarism. A few case
studies are discussed below.
A. Treatment of Mercenaries in Angola
After the Angolan Civil War and the subsequent establishment of
the People's Republic of Angola, thirteen men, each charged with
mercenarism, were put on trial in June of 1976.49 The thirteen defend-
ants were charged, inter alia, with entering Angola bearing arms and
participating in armed actions against the government, theft, rape, and
destruction of property.50 One of the thirteen, an American citizen, was
also alleged to have recruited other mercenaries from the United States,
while another was accused of offering his services as a mercenary by ad-
vertising in newspapers and journals.51 The prosecutors apparently de-
46. Boumedra, International Regulation of the Use of Mercenaries in Armed Conflicts, 20
R.D.P.M.D.G. 35, 39 (1981).
47. For details on the recruitment and use of mercenaries during the Angolan civil war,
see generally Note, The Laws of War and the Angolan Trial of Mercenaries: Death to the Dogs
of War, 9 CAsE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 323 (1977).
48. Of Bats and Dogs, EcoNOMIsT, Dec. 16, 1989, at 39. Following the assassination of
President Ahmed Abdallah Abderrahmane on November 24, 1989, the Comoros Islands were
under the control of a mercenary army led by Bob Denard, the veteran Belgian mercenary who
was also implicated in the attempted coup against President Kerekou of Benin in 1977. See
Comoros Coup, 1989 WEsT AFRICA 2079.
49. This account of the Angolan trial is derived from an article published by two of the
attorneys who were involved in the trial. See Cesner & Brant, Law of the Mercenary: An
International Dilemma, 6 CAP. U.L. Rnv. 339, 341 (1977).




rived the crime of mercenarism from four international legal precedents:
(1) the 1967 statements of the Heads of State and Government of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) appealing to all states to enact
laws declaring the recruitment and training of mercenaries a crime; (2)
UN resolutions which had condemned mercenary activity prior to the
trial;53 (3) an OAU statement on mercenary activity adopted in 1971;1
and (4) the Nuremberg Charter's definition of crimes against peace.5"
During the trial, counsel for the defendants argued that the Geneva
Conventions did not contain any provisions authorizing prosecution of
combatants solely on the basis of their status as mercenaries, and that the
defendants should therefore be classified as prisoners of war entitled to
the protections of the Geneva Conventions.56 However, the tribunal held
that the thirteen defendants were illegal combatants outside the protec-
tions of the Geneva Conventions. Accordingly, they were all declared to
be mercenaries and found guilty."
52. O.A.U. Res. AHG/49(IV) (1967), reprinted in Cesner & Brant, supra note 49, app. III
at 364.
53. See Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial
and Alien Domination and Racist Rdgimes, G.A. Res. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR C.6 Supp. (No.
30) at 142-43, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974). The resolution provides in pertinent part:
The General Assembly...
... Reaffirming the declarations made in General Assembly resolutions 2548 (XXIV)
of 11 December 1969 and 2708 (XXV) of 14 December 1970 that the practice of
using mercenaries against national liberation movements in the colonial Territories
constitutes a criminal act....
... 5. The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist r~gimes against the national
liberation movements struggling for their freedom and independence from the yoke
of colonialism and alien domination is considered to be a criminal act and the merce-
naries should accordingly be punished as criminals.
Id See also Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colo-
nial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 2465, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 4-5, U.N. Doc.
A/7218 (1968); Question of Territories under Portuguese Administration, G.A. Res. 2395, 23
U.N. GAOR C.4 Supp. (No. 18) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
54. OAU Declaration on the Activities of Mercenaries in Africa, Addis Ababa, June
1971, reprinted in Cesner & Brant, supra note 49, app. III at 365.
55. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279,
284, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546, E.A.S. No. 472. Article 6(9) of the Charter defined crimes against
peace as "planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in viola-
tion of International Treaties, Agreements, or Assurances, or participation in a common plan
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing." Id art. 6, para. 9, at 288, 59
Stat. at 1547.
56. Cesner & Brant, supra note 49, at 345-49.
57. Id. at 349. Five mercenaries were executed and nine were imprisoned. Id at 339.
In reaction to the death sentence, then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asserted that
"there is absolutely no basis in national or international law for the action now taken by the
Angolan authorities. The 'law [under which the defendants were executed] was nothing more
than an internal ordinance of the MPLA ... issued in 1966, when the MPLA was only one of
1990]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
At the time, Angolan law did not provide specifically for the crime
of mercenarism. Even the OAU's Draft Convention stated that existing
laws did not address the problem of mercenarism. 8 The court seems to
have relied on what it referred to as "modem penal law," 59 coming
within what it described as "the laws of criminal complicity." 6" The
court stated:
Mercenarism was not unknown in traditional penal law, where it was
always dealt with in relation to homicide .... Yet it is important that
in modem penal law, and in the field of comparative law, the merce-
nary crime lost all autonomous existence and was seen as a common
crime, generally speaking aggravated by the profit motive which
prompts it. And this mercenary crime, which is known today as "paid
crime to order," comes within the laws of criminal complicity, it being
through them that the responsibility of he who orders and he who is
ordered is evaluated.61
The outcome of the Angolan trial was severe and unprecedented. It
was the first time that mercenaries had been made to account for their
activity before a legal tribunal. The trial had the effect of encouraging
further inquiry into the mercenary problem. Its most immediate impact
was the drafting of the Luanda Convention on the Prevention and Sup-
pression of Mercenarism.62
many guerrilla groups operating in Angola." Statement by Secretary Kissinger (July 10, 1976),
75 DEP'T ST. BULL. 163 (1976), reprinted in McDowell, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, .71 AM. J. INT'L L. 133, 139 (1977).
58. OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa: Draft Convention on
the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenarism, O.A.U. Doc. CM/433/Rev.L, Annex 1
(1972), reprinted in W. BURCHETr & D. ROEBUCK, THE WHORES OF WAR: MERCENARIES
TODAY 234 (1977).
59. Lockwood, Report on the Trial of Mercenaries: Luanda, Angola, June 1976, 7 MAN.
L.J. 183, 198-99 (1977).
60. Id. at 199.
61. The court concluded with a dismissal of defense arguments: "This annuls the objec-
tion of the defence that the crime of mercenarism has not been defined and that there is no
penalty for it. It is in fact provided for with penalty in most evolved penal systems. As a
material crime, of coursel" Id at 198-99.
62. This Convention was prepared and unanimously adopted by the members of the Inter-
national Commission of Inquiry on Mercenaries which had been invited by the Angolan gov-
ernment to observe the trial of the mercenaries and to ensure that justice and due process
requirements were satisfied. For text of the Luanda Convention, Documents from the Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry on Mercenarism, Luanda, Angola, June 1976, see Hinds, The
Legal Status of Mercenaries: A Concept in International Humanitarian Law, 52 PHIL. L.J, 395
app. at 419 (1977). For a discussion of the International Commission's findings, see Mercenary
Trial in Angola, 60 AFRICA 17 (1976).
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B. The United States Neutrality Act
Almost two hundred years ago, in 1794, the United States enacted
the Neutrality Act.63 This Act provided that "if any person shall within
the territory or jurisdiction of the United States begin or set on foot or
provide or prepare the means for any military expedition or enterprise
... against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince or state with
whom the United States are at peace," that person would be guilty of a
misdemeanor. 4 As a result of substantial involvement by U.S. citizens in
the Spanish Civil War, Congress promulgated a new Neutrality Act, now
codified as Title 18 U.S.C. sections 958-967.6s Section 959(a) of the Act
provides:
Whoever, within the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or
retains another to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the
service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people as a sol-
dier ... shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more
than three years, or both.66
Section 958 of the Act prohibits service in a foreign force against a
state at peace with the United States,67 while section 960 prohibits the
planning of expeditions against a friendly nation.68 In contrast to the
laws of the United Kingdom discussed below, the U.S. statutes apply
only to acts occurring within the United States. It is widely perceived
63. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381 (repealed by Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 88,
§ 12, 3 Stat. 447, 450).
64. Id. § 5, 1 Stat. at 384.
65. For discussions of the Neutrality Act, see generally IL KOH, THE NATIONAL SECUR-
I-Y CONSTRUCTION: SHARING PowER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); Lobel,
The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers in
United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARv. INT'L LJ. 1 (1983).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 959 (1988).
67. Section 958 provides:
Any citizen of the United States who, within the jurisdiction thereof, accepts and
exercises a commission to serve a foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, in
war, against a prince, state, colony, district, or people, with whom the United States
is at peace, shall be fined not more than S2000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 958 (1988).
68. Section 960 provides:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or
prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or
naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or
dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with
whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than S3000 or imprisoned
not more than three years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 960 (1988).
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that the objective of these statutory provisions is to prevent the foreign
recruitment and enlistment of American citizens within the United
States.69 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Wiborg v. United States7"
that merely leaving the United States to serve as a mercenary abroad is
sufficient to avoid prosecution. This policy was articulated by then At-
torney General Robert Kennedy in the context of the Cuban "Bay of
Pigs" invasion:
The neutrality laws were never designed to prevent individuals from
leaving the United States to fight for a cause in which they believed.
Nor is an individual prohibited from departing from the United States,
with others of like belief, to join still others in a second country for an
expedition against a third country.71
The U.S. position on neutrality was neatly summed up by Assistant
Secretary of State William Schaufele, Jr., in testimony before the House
International Relations Committee Special Subcommittee on
Investigations:
The recruitment of mercenaries within the territory of the United
States to serve in the armed forces of a foreign country is an offense
under our Neutrality Law .... A legally accepted definition of what
constitutes a mercenary does not exist in international law. Nor is the
act of serving as a mercenary a crime in international law .... The
general international practice appears to consider mercenaries in the
same status as other combatants and therefore to be treated as such
under the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1949. This has certainly
been reflected in our treatment of captured Hessian troops. This was
also the case in the Civil War when there were combatants on both
sides who fought for hire, adventure or beliefs and who could be con-
sidered by some as mercenaries .... The act of being a mercenary is
not a crime in international law and mercenaries were entitled to the
same status and protection as other combatants under the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions and the rules of warfare.
72
The U.S. neutrality policy differs significantly from the United King-
dom's policy, which is detailed below.73
69. Note, Leashing the Dogs of War: Outlawing the Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries,
22 VA. J. INT'L L. 589, 597 (1982).
70. 163 U.S. 632 (1896).
71. Hinds, supra note 62, at 407.
72. DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 714-15 (E. McDowell ed. 1976).
73. The position in the United States is similar to that in Australia, Under the Australian
Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act of 1977, it is an offense to recruit, advertise,
facilitate, or promote recruitment of mercenaries to serve in the armed forces of another coun-
try. However, the Act does not prohibit enlistment of mercenaries outside Australia. Thus, as
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C. The United Kingdom's Foreign Enlistment Act
The U.K.'s Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 (Act) states inter alia:
If any person, without the licence of Her Majesty, being a British sub-
ject, within or without her Majesty's dominions, accepts or agrees to
accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service
of any foreign state at war with any foreign state at peace with Her
Majesty... [hle shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall
be punishable by fine and imprisonment or, either of such punishments
74
The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 is still in force."5 In contrast to
the U.S. legislation, this Act applies to acts both inside and outside the
territory of the United Kingdom. Whether the U.K.'s Act applies to
enlistment in a guerrilla force is unclear. Section 30 of the Act defines
"foreign state" to include "any foreign prince, colony, province or part of
any province or people... assuming to exercise the powers of govern-
ment in or over any foreign country, colony, province or part of any
province . . ,"76 Implicit in this definition is the requirement of actual
control or governance of a territory.' Thus, whether the Act applies to
enlistment in a guerilla force which controls no territory is unclear be-
cause the Act applies only to enlistment in the military or naval service
of a "foreign state."
The growing involvement of British citizens in the Angolan conflict
led directly to an inquiry by the Diplock Committee,"8 whose report was
published in August 1976."9 The Diplock Report concluded that the
Foreign Enlistment Act was unsatisfactory and unrealisticW1 The Com-
mittee took the view that mercenarism per se should not be made a crime
in the United Kingdom partly because there was no satisfactory defini-
tion for the term "mercenary." 8 The Committee recommended that the
recruitment in the United Kingdom of persons as mercenaries in order to
with the U.S. legislation, an Australian citizen may legally recruit mercenaries outside Austra-
lia. See Green, The New Law of Armed Conflict, 1977 CAN. Y.B. INTL 3, 18-19.
74. Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 90, § 4.
75. For an analysis of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, see generally Layeb, United
Kingdom Legislative Control of Mercenary Activit-Its Effectiveness, 27 R.D.P.M.D.G. 45-81
(1988); Morris, The Foreign Enlistment Act 1870: When ill It Be Abolished? 130 SoLic. J.
271 (1986).
76. Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 90, § 30.
77. See Burmester, supra note 12, at 50 ("The Act is applicable to internal civil conflicts
only if the insurgents exercise some regular control over part of the territory of a state.")
78. See supra note 27.
79. REPORT, supra note 27.
80. Id at 8.
81. Id at 12.
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take part in foreign armed conflicts, and not mercenarism itself, should
be made a criminal offense. 2 To date, no legislation has been passed to
implement the Diplock Committee's Report. However, the Report was
concerned more with problems of domestic law enforcement than with
the broader question of mercenarism in its global context. The British
statements accepting the definition of mercenary provided in article 47(2)
of Protocol 183 are a more recent and probably more authoritative inter-
pretation of the British position on mercenarism at the international
level.
D. The OAU and UN Efforts to Deal with Mercenaries
Since its inception in 1960, the OAU has on numerous occasions
tried to grapple with the problem of mercenaries in Africa. Mercenarism
has been a peculiarly African problem in the last four decades. Merce-
naries have been used extensively by ex-colonial powers, often against
national liberation movements. As a result, "the mercenary is seen as the
representative of colonialism and of racist oppression."84 There are
many historical incidents of mercenarism in Africa. It was in the context
of the Congolese Civil War that international concern regarding merce-
nary activities in Africa first arose. In a 1961 resolution, the UN Secur-
ity Council called for the immediate withdrawal of all Belgian and other
foreign mercenaries, and urged all states to take immediate measures to
prevent the departure of mercenaries for the Congo from their territo-
ries.85 The OAU also appealed to the Republic of Congo to refrain from
recruitment of foreign mercenaries and to expel those who still remained
within its borders.
8 6
In 1968, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2465 on the
implementation of the Declaration of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples. In paragraph 8 of the Resolution, the General Assem-
bly declared:
82. For reaction to the Diplock Committee's proposals, see generally Legum, Why Britain
Must Keep Mercenaries Out of Rhodesia, The Observer (London), Aug. 8, 1976, at 8, col. 2.
83. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
84. T. ELIAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SOME CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 159 (1983).
85. S.C. Res. 161, 16 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/16/Rev. 1 (1961).
It has been argued that this resolution was passed by the Security Council pursuant to "its
powers to prevent a breach of the peace and related only to the situation in the Congo."
Burmester, supra note 12, at 49. To that extent, the resolution "did not reflect a general norm
of international law." Id.
86. O.A.U. Doc. ECM/Res. 55 (III) (1964), reprinted in Cesner & Brant, supra note 49,
app. III at 364.
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[Trhe practice of using mercenaries against movements for national lib-
eration and independence is punishable as a criminal act and that the
mercenaries themselves are outlaws, and call[ed] upon the Govern-
ments of all countries to enact legislation declaring the recruitment,
financing and training of mercenaries in their territory to be a punish-
able offence and prohibiting their nationals from serving as merce-
87naries ....
The General Assembly also discussed the mercenary problem in colo-
nized territories in resolution 3103 by reaffirming "the declarations made
in General Assembly resolutions 2548 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969 and
2708 (XXV) of 14 December 1970 that the practice of using mercenaries
against national liberation movements in the colonial Territories consti-
tutes a criminal act ... ,," The General Assembly also declared that
"[ihe use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the na-
tional liberation movements struggling for their freedom and indepen-
dence from the yoke of colonialism and alien domination is considered to
be a criminal act and the mercenaries should accordingly be punished as
criminals."8 9
The UN resolution was significant in that it was the first time the
practice of using mercenaries was declared punishable as a criminal act.
However, the legal effect of this resolution is limited. First, it is subject
to the limitations which apply to all General Assembly resolutions. 90
Second, its ambit was only meant to extend to colonial situations involv-
ing colonized territories, and it was apparently adopted with the African
continent in mind. Nevertheless, the more authoritative UN Security
87. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples, supra note 53, at 5.
88. Basic Principles on the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and
Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, supra note 53, at 142.
89. Id. at 143.
90. Several authors argue that General Assembly resolutions and declarations do not have
any legally binding force. Sem eg., Jenks, The Scope of International Law, 1954 Bar. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1; Onuf, Professor Falk on the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly,
64 AM. J. INT'L L.. 349-55 (1970).
Admittedly, such resolutions are not a formal source of law within the formulation of
article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Under the UN Charter, the
Assembly does not have the legal competence to legislate or to adopt legally binding decisions
except those regarding certain organizational matters such as regulations for the Secretariat
and other procedural rules.
However, despite their formally non-binding character, "even within the conservative
framework of article 38 of the statute, legal effect may be given to the collective pronounce-
ments of the General Assembly." Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development,
15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 5 (1976).
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Council also passed several resolutions on the mercenary issue.91
In 1972, the OAU Committee of Experts, charged with drafting a
convention on mercenaries, presented its report, part of which was the
OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa,92 to the
OAU. This Convention was the first major attempt to extend the issue of
sanctions for mercenarism to an international level. However, the Con-
vention was specifically aimed at the problem in Africa, and not at the
problem in other parts of the globe. The continued practice of mercenar-
ism made it clear to the OAU and to the international community that
the numerous resolutions being produced were not having any discerni-
ble impact on the mercenary problem. For examlple, the resolutions did
not prevent the extensive use of mercenaries in the Angolan conflict of
1975. It became clear that, given the nature of the problem, any efforts
at curbing the practice of mercenarism had to take the form of a multilat-
eral convention.
Efforts to deal with the problem of mercenarism were extended to
the global level at the United Nations. In 1980, art ad hoc Committee on
the Drafting of an International Convention against the Recruitment,
Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries was set up by the General
Assembly to draft a Convention.93 This was a clear signal to the world
community of the importance given by the United Nations to the prob-
lem of mercenaries. The thirty-five member Committee began its deliber-
ations in 1981, and its draft Convention was adopted by the General
Assembly in 1989.9' The Convention covers all mercenaries, irrespective
91. For example, after deliberations on the 1977 invasion of Benin, the Security Council
adopted the following:
The Security Council...
... 3. Reaffirms its Resolution 239 (1967) ... which, inter alia .... condemns any
State which persists in permitting or tolerating the recruitment of mercenaries and
the provision of facilities to them, with the objective of overthrowing the Govern-
ments of Member States.
4. Calls upon all states to exercise the utmost vigilance against the danger posed by
international mercenaries and to ensure that their territory and other territories
under their control, as well as their nationals, are not used for the planning of subver-
sion and recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries designed to overthrow the
Government of any Member State;
5. Further calls upon all states to consider taking necessary measures to prohibit,
under their respective domestic laws, the recruitment, training and transit of merce-
naries on their territory and other territories under their control ....
S.C. Res. 405, 32 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. at 18, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977).
92. See OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa: Draft Convention
on the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenarism, supra note 58.
93. G.A. Res. 48, 35 U.N. GAOR C.6 Supp. (No. 48) at 257, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981).
94. See International Convention on Mercenaries, supra note 3.
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of the internal or international nature of the armed conflict in which they
are engaged.9 5 The Convention is very comprehensive; it covers even
mercenaries outside the framework of an armed conflict.96 However, it is
important to note that when the Convention finally comes into effect, it
will be binding only on the states which agree to be party to it. The
Committee's terms of reference also suggest that the Convention is more
concerned with thejus ad bellum than with the jus in bello.9'
V. TRENDS IN THE TREATMENT OF MERCENARIES
UNDER THE JUS IN BELLO: AN ASSESSMENT
Traditionally, mercenaries were treated as prisoners of war when
captured, and there is no indication that they were ever treated any dif-
ferently than enemy nationals.98 For example, during the American
Revolution, the Hessian mercenaries who fought against American colo-
nists and were captured were treated as prisoners of war.99 Foreign vol-
unteers fighting for the Boers were similarly treated as prisoners of war
when captured."c° It has even been suggested that mercenaries were
sometimes treated better than enemy nationals.10 1
95. Article 1, para. 2 describes mercenarism as the act of participating in "a concerted act
of violence aimed at... [o]verthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitu-
tional order of a state... ." Id. art. 1, para. 2, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 89, 92 (1990). Thus, one
could arguably be guilty of mercenarism in a civil or internal armed conflict, as well as in an
international armed conflict.
96. In addition to the definition of mercenary discussed above, article 1, section 2 of the
International Convention on Mercenaries provides:
A Mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation: (a) Is specially recruited
locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed
at:
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional
order of a State; or
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a state
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private
gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation;
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is
directed-,
(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is
undertaken.
Id art. 1, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 89, 92 (1990) (emphasis added).
97. UN Committee Reports "Considerable Progress" on Anti-Mercenary Convention, [26
No. 2] U.N. CHRONICLE 34 (1989).
98. H. Foois, PRisoNERs oF WAR 28-29 (1924).
99. Id. at 28. See also Comment, supra note 24, at 154.
100. See H. FooKs, supra note 98, at 29.
101. See eg., Comment, supra note 24, at 151 n.44 (In fact at times mercenaries have
been treated better than enemy nationals, as in the Boer War when Americans fighting for the
1990]
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The question of mercenarism is dealt with indirectly in the Hague
Convention of 1907 which contains principles pertaining to neutrality
and hostile military expeditions. Article 4 of Hague Convention No. V
provides that "[c]orps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting
agencies opened on the territory of a neutral power to assist the belliger-
ents."'" 2 However, the Convention also absolves a neutral power of re-
sponsibility if persons (nationals or foreigners) cross its borders on their
own initiative to offer their services to one of the belligerents.10 3 The
most relevant provision of the Hague Convention, for our purposes, can
be found in article 17:
A neutral cannot avail himself of his neutrality:
a) If he commits hostile acts against a belligerent
b) If he commits acts in favor of a belligerent, particularly if he volun-
tarily enlists in the ranks of the armed force of one of the parties.
In such a case, the neutral shall not be more severely treated by the
belligerent as against whom he has abandoned his neutrality than a
national of the other belligerent state could be for the same act.
104
Although mercenarism is not directly regulated by the Hague Con-
vention, article 17 suggests that the Convention's provisions could be
deemed applicable to mercenaries. Those who forfeit their neutral status
by enlisting on the side of either belligerent would be treated as legitimate
combatants entitled to the same treatment accorded other belligerents.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 do not provide expressis verbis for
mercenaries. However, article 4(A) of the Third Geneva Convention is
authority for the proposition that mercenaries are protected as prisoners
of war. Article 4(A) of the Third Convention regards as legitimate com-
batants "armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such aimed forces.. .,"15 as
well as "other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements,"106 provided they meet certain
requisite conditions.10 7 This suggests that mercenaries who participate
Boers against England were not sent to the inhospitable climate of Ceylon as other prisoners
were.")
102. Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land, 1907, art. 4, reprinted in Bustamante, The Hague Convention Con-
cerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Land Warfare, 2 AM. J. INT'L
L. 95, 105 (1908).
103. Id. art. 6, reprinted in Bustamante, supra note 102, at 105.
104. Id. art. 17, reprinted in Bustamante, supra note 102, at 118.
105. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(A)(1), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75
U.N.T.S. at 138.
106. Id. art. 4(A)(2), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
107. These conditions are easily satisfied by mercenaries. See Comment, supra note 24, at
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on behalf of one of the belligerents in an international conflict, and who
satisfy the conditions, could be considered legitimate belligerents, and
therefore, would be entitled to prisoner of war treatment in the event of
capture. The difficulty with this argument is that the mercenaries in
question would have to be certified as members of the armed forces or
resistance group concerned. Some authorities have concluded that the
private character of mercenaries distinguishes them from the public na-
ture of armed forces, and "[a]lthough mercenaries fight alongside such
armed forces, and are sometimes integrated into their ranks, the fact that
they are acting for private ends keeps them apart from the rest of the
members of an armed force."108 Other authors disagree with this inter-
pretation. Mr. John Cotton, for example, relies on other provisions of
the Geneva Conventions to come to the conclusion that mercenaries are
legitimate and protected combatants. 9 He construes article 16, which
requires equal treatment by the detaining power "without any adverse
distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opin-
ions,"' 0 as precluding a distinction in the treatment of mercenaries. '
Interpreted one way or the other, it is apparent that the Geneva
Conventions did not expressly prescribe the treatment to be accorded
mercenaries." 2 Protocol I is the first convention expressly dealing with
the legal status of mercenaries in the law of war. Paragraph 1 of article
157 ("As required by Article 4, [mercenaries] are habitually uniformed, serving under a com-
mander, carrying arms openly and normally conducting their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war.")
108. Yusuf, Mercenaries in the Law of Armed Conflicts, THE NEw HuMANrARAN LAW
OF ARMED CONFuCT 113, 123 (A. Cassese ed. 1979).
Mallison and Mallison also refute the argument that mercenaries are protected by the
laws of war, stating that:
Neither Art. 9 of the Brussels Declaration, nor Art. I of the Hague Regulations, nor
Art. 4 of the 1949 Conventions provides legal authority for armed bands of maraud-
ers or pirates acting principally for private purposes as opposed to public ones. Even
if such bands used an internal military-like discipline, they could not meet the Brus-
sels-Hague-Geneva criteria.
Mallison & Mallison, The Juridical Status of Irregular Combatants Under the International
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 9 CAsE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 38, 50 (1977).
109. See Comment, supra note 24, at 158. See also A. RosAs, supra note 20, at 400 ('[H]ad
the drafters of the 1949 Geneva Conventions been called upon to take issue on this question
one might surmise that a clear majority would have included mercenaries among the categories
of prisoners of war.")
110. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 16, 6 U.S.T. at 3330,75 U.N.T.S. at 148.
111. Comment, supra note 24, at 158.
112. Cassese, supra note 44, at 6-7 ("[]t is clear, therefore, that current international law
does not make provision for the phenomenon of mercenarism in its present manifestations ....
[I]nternational law does not provide States with any specific weapon against this category of
belligerent.")
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47 provides that "a mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant
or a prisoner of war."113 Unlike the earlier UN and OAU prescriptions,
article 47 considers the use of mercenaries in general, irrespective of their
involvement against national liberation movements or against sovereign
states. Article 47 seeks to deprive all mercenaries involved in interstate
and national liberation wars of the status of legitimate combatants, re-
gardless of the party to the conflict for which they are fighting. One may
reasonably conclude that this was an attempt by Ihe drafters to address
the use of mercenaries both for and against national liberation
movements.'
14
The drafters of article 47 may have had good reason for seeking to
regulate mercenarism in armed conflicts. Third World countries in par-
ticular have suffered considerably as a result of the activities of merce-
naries. The few examples given above explain the intensity of feeling and
opprobrium attached to mercenarism in its modern day manifestations.
However, the drafters of article 47 went overboa:rd in their well-inten-
tioned efforts to regulate and mitigate the incidence of mercenarism. In
providing that a mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or
prisoner of war, it is obvious that mercenaries are being penalized for the
fact of being mercenaries and nothing else. On its face, article 47 ex-
pressly denies mercenaries any legitimacy, irrespective of how well they
comply with the laws of war.
Mr. Guy Roberts argues that article 47(1) "violates the basic princi-
ple underlying Protocol I that individuals who take an active part in hos-
tilities should not be discriminated against on the basis of their motives
for joining in the combat."' 115 What he forgets to add, however, is that
the preamble which he cites alludes to nondiscrimination between "all
persons who are protected by those instruments."' 16 Therefore, it is ar-
guable that, by virtue of article 47(1), mercenaries are not persons who
are protected by the Protocol in the manner contemplated.
Nevertheless, a more fundamental objection may be made to article
47(1). There is a need to expand protection under the laws of war to as
many combatants and conflicts as possible. It seems counter-intuitive
and contradictory to deprive mercenaries of combatant and prisoner of
113. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 47, para. 1, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1412 (1977).
114. See also Cassese, supra note 44, at 23 ("Thus, it is implicitly foreseen that mercenaries
may be used not only by States (fighting against other States or national liberation movements)
but also by groups who, appealing to the principle of self-determination of people, declare that
their struggle against the government of a sovereign State constitutes a war of national
liberation.")
115. Roberts, supra note 24, at 134.
116. See Protocol I, supra note 5, Preamble, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1396 (1977).
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war status while extending these protections to guerrillas and national
liberation fighters." 7 Article 47(1) stands out as an incongruous provi-
sion in a document designed to promote humaneness in armed conflict.
As odious as the activities of mercenaries may be, it would accord
with ordinary good sense to grant them prisoner of war status if they
complied with the laws of war. This would serve as an incentive to mer-
cenaries to comply with the laws of war. This, in turn, might make the
activities of mercenaries less troublesome than they have been in the past.
In addition, denial of combatant and prisoner of war status to merce-
naries is at variance with the principle of humanity and the cause of
human rights in general. Thus, from a strictly humanitarian standpoint,
extending the applicability of the Protocol to mercenaries can only have
a salutary effect on the law of armed conflict. More importantly, grant-
ing prisoner of war status to mercenaries does not in any way endanger
the safety of civilian populations. On the contrary, the security of the
civilian populace will be enhanced if mercenaries are encouraged to com-
ply with the laws of war.
Mercenaries do have certain protections under the Protocol,
notwithstanding their illegal combatant status. Article 47(1) states that a
mercenary "shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of
war. 11 8 This must not be equated with the phrase "shall not be ac-
corded" a combatant or prisoner of war status. Many delegates at the
Diplomatic Conference argued for the latter provision.1 9 The implica-
tion of such a provision would have been grave--it would have implied,
for example, that any contracting state party which accorded prisoner of
war status to a captured mercenary would be in violation of the Protocol.
The travaux priparatoires suggests that mercenaries are entitled to
certain fundamental guarantees even though they are denied combatant
and prisoner of war status. Paragraph 3 of article 45 provides, inter alia,
that "[a]ny person who has taken part in hostilities, who is not entitled to
prisoner of war status and who does not benefit from more favorable
treatment in accordance with the Fourth Convention shall have the right
at all times to the protection of article 75120 of this Protocol." '' It is
117. Art. 1(4) of Protocol I extends greater protections to national liberation movements
by classifying wars involving such movements as international armed conflicts. I have dis-
cussed this in an earlier article. See Kwakwa, The Use of Force by National Liberation Move-
ments Trends Toward a Developing Norm? (Book Review) 14 YALE J. INT'L L 199 (1989).
118. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 47, para. 1, reprinted in 16 I.LM. 1391, 1412 (1977).
119. See XV OFF. RECS., supra note 18, para. 105 ("[A] number of delegations desired to
see an absolute requirement that mercenaries must not be treated as prisoners of war or com-
batants, thus making it mandatory that the capturing Power deny such status.")
120. Article 75 applies to "persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who
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evident that mercenaries fall within this provision: they take part in hos-
tilities, they are not entitled to prisoner of war status according to article
47(1), and thus, they do not benefit from more favorable treatment in
accordance with the Fourth Convention. Several delegates at the Diplo-
matic Conference clearly stated that, in their view, the fundamental guar-
antees provided in article 75 applied to mercenaries. 122 The Report of
the Third Committee was also clear and unequivocal:
[A]lithough the proposed new article [47] makes no reference to the
fundamental protections of [article 75], it was understood by the Com-
mittee that mercenaries would be one of the groups entitled to the pro-
tections of that article which establishes minimum standards of
treatment for persons not entitled to more favourable treatment under
the Conventions and Protocol J.123
All of these statements were implicitly accepted at the Diplomatic Con-
ference.124 Therefore, mercenaries are at least entitled to the minimal
guarantees provided in article 75 of the Protocol.
VI. CONCLUSION
The definition of mercenaries provided in Protocol I still presents
do not benefit from more favorable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol,"
Such persons "shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum,
the protection provided by this Article without any adverse distinction based upon race, color,
sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth,
birth or other status, or any other similar criteria." Protocol I, s upra note 5, art. 75, para. 1,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1423 (1977). The Article also has 3 paragraphs detailing the
minimum definition of humane treatment, including procedures for the prosecution of persons
indicted for war crimes.
121. Id., art. 45, para. 3, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1411 (1977).
122. See, eg., Statement by Australia, in VI OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT Oi INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS [hereinafter VI OFF. REcs.] CDDH/
SR.41, at 175 (1978) ("The Australian delegation holds the view that mercenaries who arc in
the hands of a Party to an armed conflict to which draft Protocol I applies, are entitled to the
benefits of the treatment provided for by [article 75] of that Protocol."); Statement by Nether-
lands, in VI OFF. REcs., supra, at 194 ("[Ihe Netherlands delegation reiterates the applicabil-
ity to a mercenary of the fundamental guarantees embodied in (article 47 and 75]"; Statement
by Mexico, in VI OFF. REcs., supra, at 192 ("It is the understanding of the delegation of
Mexico that the guarantees contained in [article 75] are implicitly applicable to
[mercenaries].")
123. XV OFF. REcs., supra note 18, para. 27.
124. Indeed, even the Nigerian delegation, which originally proposed the draft provision on
mercenaries, recognized the fundamental guarantees provided in article 75 as well as "the
common humanity which mercenaries shared with the rest of mankind." See VI OFF. RECS,,
supra note 122, para. 81. The Canadian representative, in turn, "welcomed the recognition by
the Nigerian representative that mercenaries were entitled to the fundamental guarantees pro-
vided in [article 75]." Id. para. 98.
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problems of identification. The definition is so tightly drafted that it may
almost invariably exclude all possible combatants. On the other hand,
the narrow definition may be explained by the fact that mercenaries are
expressly denied combatant and prisoner of war status. Thus, because of
the legal consequences flowing from labeling a person a mercenary, it is
understandable that the drafters attempted to be restrictive in their defi-
nition. Before deciding the treatment to be accorded a suspected merce-
nary, a determination will have to be made as to whether or not the
combatant in question falls within the definition of mercenary provided
in the second paragraph. In the interim, pending any such determination
by a competent tribunal, the combatant in question must be presumed to
be a prisoner of war (and thus protected by the Third Geneva Conven-
tion) until his status is established. 1"
With regard to treatment, article 47(1) denies mercenaries combat-
ant or prisoner of war status. The legal effect of the denial of combatant
and prisoner of war status is to deprive a captured mercenary of the
treatment of prisoner of war as laid down in the Third Geneva Conven-
tion, and to subject him to criminal prosecution. This denial of combat-
ant status to mercenaries has grave consequences. It will provide
mercenaries with no incentive to comply with the law of war, and hence,
the real victims will be noncombatants.
However, it is apparent that the article, on its face, simply Jenies
mercenaries combatant and prisoner of war status as of right. State Par-
ties are still at liberty to accord mercenaries prisoner of war treatment if
they are so inclined. Although not entitled to prisoner of war status as of
right, the mercenary is guaranteed all the fundamental safeguards of arti-
cle 75.
Variations in state practices may lead to unpredictable outcomes in
different conflicts. Some states may avail themselves of the liberty of ac-
cording captured mercenaries prisoner of war treatment, while others
may choose to follow the strict text of article 47. Under the circum-
stances, it is in a prospective mercenary's interest to find out a state's
practice with regard to treatment of captured mercenaries before decid-
ing whether to enlist in any particular armed conflict against that state.
State practice on the Protocol is still in its formative stages. While
125. Article 5(2) of the Third Geneva Convention provides:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act
and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enu-
merated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Conven-
tion until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3324, 75 U.N.T.S. at 142.
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there seems to be virtual agreement on the definition of mercenaries, sub-
sequent state practice may show conflicting attitudes in the treatment of
mercenaries. Needless to say, it would have been more desirable and
more in conformity with international humanitarian law if there was uni-
formity in state practice on the treatment of mercenaries. Uniformity of
treatment and approach to the mercenary problem is important because
the phenomenon of mercenarism cuts across national boundaries. To
date, there has been no reported incident of the treatment accorded to
any captured mercenary subsequent to the drafting of Protocol I. Hope-
fully, the practice of states in the future will tend toward a recognition of
the need to grant mercenaries prisoner of war status upon capture. Such
a development would result in a more humanitarian law of armed con-
flict, induce mercenaries to comply more scrupulously with the laws of
war, and ultimately inure to the benefit of the noncombatant population
as well.
